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ABSTRACT—Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have been divided on how to determine the citizenship of dissolved or 
inactive corporations for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. By the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, courts of appeals addressing the issue 
had settled on one of three conclusions: (1) citizenship should be 
determined only by the corporation’s state of incorporation; (2) citizenship 
should be determined both by the corporation’s state of incorporation and 
its last principal place of business; or (3) citizenship should always be 
determined by the corporation’s state of incorporation, but only be 
determined by principal place of business on a case-by-case basis. In 2010, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend clarified the standard for 
determining an active corporation’s principal place of business. Two years 
later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Holston Investments, Inc. 
B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp. ruled that the reasoning of Hertz settled the 
debate over the citizenship of dissolved or inactive corporations: only the 
inactive or dissolved corporation’s state of incorporation determines 
citizenship. This Note argues that although Hertz provided useful guidance 
to the courts of appeals on how to determine the citizenship of dissolved 
and inactive corporations, the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted that 
guidance. The Eleventh Circuit should have adopted a modified version of 
an existing rule, which always factors both an inactive or dissolved 
corporation’s state of incorporation and its last principal place of business 
when determining citizenship. This test better accords with the Court’s 
reasoning in Hertz, the intent behind the statutory definition of corporate 
citizenship, and broader principles of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
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In May 2007, shipping and aviation entrepreneur Paul Gartlan closed a 
deal with LanLogistics Corporation to purchase subsidiary companies of 
LanLogistics, including one called LanBox.1 LanLogistics was a Delaware-
chartered corporation that had its corporate headquarters in Florida.2 
According to Holston Investments, Inc., B.V.I.—a British Virgin Islands 
company with a Florida business affiliate—this violated a contract between 
Holston and LanLogistics.3 Holston had previously purchased a separate 
subsidiary from LanLogistics and it now argued the deal between Gartlan 
and LanLogistics violated Holston’s contractual right of first refusal to 
purchase LanBox.4 In the aftermath of the deal with Gartlan, LanLogistics 
formally dissolved and forfeited its authority to conduct business in Florida 
at the end of 2007.5 Five months later, Holston Investments and its Florida 
affiliate sued LanLogistics in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
 
1 Holston Invs. Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics, Corp. (Holston I), 664 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260–61 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009); see also About Us, SKYWORLD AIR CARGO, http://www.skyworldaircargo.com/about-
us.html [http://perma.cc/38YS-M9UJ] (background detail on Paul Gartlan).  
2 Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp. (Holston III), 677 F.3d 1068, 1069 (11th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam). 
3 Holston I, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
4 Id.; see also Albert P. Hernandez, WIKINVEST, http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Skypostal_
Networks_Inc_(SKPN)/Albert_Hernandez_Chairman_Chief_Executive_Officer [http://perma.cc/345A-
P7DL] (summary of Holston Investments’ past dealings with LanLogistics). 
5 Holston III, 677 F.3d at 1070 n.1. 
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District of Florida under diversity jurisdiction for breach of contract.6 At 
the time of the lawsuit, all parties seemingly agreed that the federal court 
had the requisite diversity jurisdiction to hear the case: LanLogistics’s 
supposed Delaware citizenship was diverse from the plaintiffs’ Florida and 
British Virgin Islands citizenship.7 
Over two years after the action in federal court commenced, the 
federal district court issued judgment for the plaintiffs on the breach of 
contract claim.8 Only after the supposed disposition of this straightforward 
state law claim did the case transform into the latest battle over the 
citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations for federal diversity 
jurisdiction. 
Soon after receiving an adverse judgment, LanLogistics moved to 
vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the 
two parties’ citizenships were not truly diverse at the time the lawsuit was 
filed.9 For the first time, LanLogistics brought to the trial court’s attention 
that Florida had been its principal place of business at the time of the deal 
with Gartlan that gave rise to Holston’s claim.10 LanLogistics now argued 
that its late-2007 dissolution did not change the fact that, at the time the suit 
was filed, LanLogistics was a citizen of both Delaware and Florida.11 
Because there had been Florida citizens on both sides of the suit, 
LanLogistics now argued that diversity jurisdiction had never existed and 
the federal district court had no authority to enter or enforce its judgment 
on the breach of contract claim.12 
The federal district court faced clearly suspect circumstances: how 
convenient that a defendant with an adverse judgment hanging over its 
head coincidentally remembered that it was also a Florida citizen. 
Nonetheless, the court also faced the unwavering obligation under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a case if the court “at any time” 
determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.13 Had the trial court, 
from beginning to end, presided over a case without ever having subject 
matter jurisdiction, or were these newly revealed facts irrelevant to the 
court’s jurisdiction? 
Congress is constitutionally permitted to give federal courts 
jurisdiction over state law cases when the case involves citizens of different 
 




9 Id. at 1328–29. 
10 Id. at 1329. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
246 
states.14 Since 1958, Congress has bestowed upon corporations a sort of 
dual citizenship when it comes to diversity jurisdiction. To determine 
whether a case involving a corporation may properly be heard in federal 
court under diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is considered to be a citizen 
both of the state in which it incorporated and the state in which it has its 
“principal place of business.”15 Determining an active corporation’s 
principal place of business has proven to be a difficult task,16 but the 
meaning of “principal place of business” becomes particularly cryptic in 
the case of dissolved or inactive corporations. 
The trial court in Holston Investments Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics, 
Corp. had no precedent from its own Eleventh Circuit to address the 
meaning of principal place of business in this context, but instead faced a 
three-way circuit split. The Second Circuit determined the citizenship of 
inactive corporations by looking to the corporation’s state of incorporation, 
as well as its last principal place of business activity.17 The Third Circuit 
only recognized the corporation’s state of incorporation, reasoning that a 
dissolved or inactive corporation can have no principal place of business.18 
The Fifth and Fourth Circuits have always looked to the corporation’s state 
of incorporation, but then conduct a “totality of the circumstances” analysis 
to determine if the corporation’s last principal place of business should be 
considered.19 Since the emergence of the three-way circuit split, the 
Supreme Court, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, settled how federal courts 
determine an active corporation’s principal place of business, which is by a 
“nerve center” test.20 
Analyzing the split, as well as Hertz, the Holston trial court joined the 
Third Circuit: LanLogistics was only a citizen of Delaware at the time the 
lawsuit was filed.21 Therefore, the trial court had diversity jurisdiction and 
could leave the judgment against LanLogistics undisturbed. A year later, 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the jurisdiction 
 
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). For a district court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, it must also 
conclude that the amount in controversy in the given lawsuit is over $75,000. Id. § 1332(a); see also 
13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602 (3d ed. 2009 & 
Supp. 2014) (for a general description of diversity jurisdiction).  
16 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
17 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 
1991).  
18 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995). 
19 See Athena Auto., Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 1999); Harris v. Black 
Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 550–51 (5th Cir. 1992). 
20 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (adopting the “nerve center” test for determining a corporation’s principal 
place of business).  
21 Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1330–33 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  
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question,22 making it the most recent court of appeals to enter the circuit 
split and the first to do so since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hertz. 
This Note argues that the Holston court should have resolved the 
ambiguity over dissolved or inactive corporate citizenship by adopting a 
slightly modified version of the Second Circuit’s rule, which would make 
dissolved and inactive corporations citizens of both their state of 
incorporation and their last “nerve center.” Unlike the Holston court’s 
adopted framework, this rule would more clearly accord with relevant 
statutory text, administrative efficiency concerns, and relevant legislative 
history; the three factors considered in Hertz. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of federal diversity 
jurisdiction as it relates to corporations and the emergence of a circuit split 
over how to determine the citizenship of inactive and dissolved 
corporations. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hertz, and its 
relation to Holston and the current three-way circuit split. Part III argues 
that the Eleventh Circuit erred in siding with the Third Circuit and should 
have instead adopted a modified version of the Second Circuit’s rule. There 
is no clear justification for a dissolved or inactive corporation to receive a 
forum option that Congress would not have allowed were the corporation 
active. The argument that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is favorable due 
to its ease of application fails, both because the approach bucks the intent 
of Congress by allowing for a blanket expansion of diversity jurisdiction 
and because little supports the proposition that a modified Second Circuit 
approach would be particularly burdensome administratively. 
I. EXPLAINING THE SPLIT 
A cursory review of the origins of diversity jurisdiction and the 
evolving manner in which courts and Congress have understood how 
diversity jurisdiction is properly exercised over corporations will help 
contextualize the circuit split over dissolved and inactive corporations. 
A. Early Diversity Jurisdiction 
The Constitution extends the judicial power of federal courts to 
“[c]ontroversies . . . between [c]itizens of different [s]tates.”23 Congress is 
not obligated to grant the federal courts this type of jurisdiction. Rather, 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution allows Congress to define the scope 
of lower federal court diversity jurisdiction as long as that scope does not 
exceed the jurisdictional grant in Article III.24 
 
22 Holston III, 677 F.3d 1068, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming as to the subject 
matter jurisdiction issue but reversing as to the trial court’s calculation of damages). 
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
24 Id. art. I, § 8; Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799). 
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The purpose of diversity jurisdiction centers around the Framers’ 
distrust of state courts or, at least, concern over the possibility that state 
courts might not fairly adjudicate claims involving citizens of different 
states.25 Whatever the exact purpose or purposes behind diversity 
jurisdiction, the first Congress took action to grant the authority to the 
newly created lower federal courts.26 
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction did not, however, direct how 
a court should handle suits involving corporations. Without the aid of 
Congress, the Supreme Court developed its own doctrine for dealing with 
corporate citizenship. Chief Justice John Marshall penned the Court’s first 
statement on the matter, reasoning that corporations were “invisible, 
intangible, and artificial” and “certainly not a citizen.”27 Accordingly, a 
court assessed the citizenship of each member of the corporation, rather 
than the corporation as a standalone citizen.28 The Court overruled this 
approach in 1844, holding that a corporation is a citizen of its state of 
incorporation for jurisdictional purposes.29 For a number of decades after, 
however, the Court struggled to settle whether or not this was always the 
case.30 
The Supreme Court’s doctrine eventually led to public discontent. In 
the infamous Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co. case, a company intentionally obtained its charter 
in a different state from the state in which it conducted its business so that 
it would have the option of litigating all of its claims in federal court.31 The 
Court found that diversity jurisdiction existed, even though all but the 
company’s incorporation papers indicated it was a citizen of the same state 
 
25 See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Chief Justice Marshall 
discussing suspicions of state courts contemplated by the Constitution); see also James Madison, 
Address at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1412, 1414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) 
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction provides relief to out-of-state litigants from the administrative 
deficiencies and delays of many state courts); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495 (1928) (reviewing primary documents from the time of the 
Constitutional Conventions indicating the Framers were primarily concerned with hostile state 
legislatures, rather than impartial state courts). 
26 Even with diversity of citizenship, lower federal courts were unable to hear cases with an amount 
in controversy not exceeding $500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.  
27 Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.  
28 Id. at 86–88. 
29 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555, 559 (1844). 
30 Compare Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328–29 (1853) (establishing a 
rebuttable presumption that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation), with St. Louis & S.F. 
Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896) (confirming that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation 
by irrebuttable presumption that its members are citizens of the same state).  
31 276 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1928).  
109:243 (2015) Digging Up the Corp(ses) 
249 
as its opposition.32 The Court reasoned that existing jurisdictional law did 
not require an inquiry into the intent behind a company’s choice to 
incorporate in a particular state.33 
Soon after Black & White Taxicab, members of Congress and scholars 
began debating the most appropriate means for determining a corporation’s 
citizenship.34 Mixed with a growing concern about the caseloads facing 
federal courts, Congress took action to address the citizenship of 
corporations in the late 1950s. 
B. Congress Speaks on the Citizenship of Corporations 
In 1958, Congress amended its diversity jurisdiction law to increase 
the requisite amount in controversy and to define a corporation’s 
citizenship as being both “any State by which it has been incorporated and 
of the State where it has its principal place of business.”35 Congress had a 
number of goals in passing this amendment. Perhaps most significantly, 
Congress meant for the revisions to reduce the federal district courts’ 
caseloads.36 Using identical statements of purpose, the Senate and House 
reports recommending the bill’s passage note that the number of civil cases 
coming before federal district courts had “increased tremendously” in the 
years leading up to 1958.37 The reports state that the changes increasing the 
amount in controversy and addressing the citizenship of corporations would 
ease the workload of the federal courts.38 
Congress’s choice to address the citizenship of corporations in the 
1958 amendment was driven by at least one other motive. The House and 
Senate reports on the bill address a concern over the “fictional premise” 
under which corporations had been permitted to utilize the federal courts.39 
The reports note that the Court-crafted doctrine on the citizenship of 
corporations “has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged 
in a local business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its 
litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate 
 
32 Id. at 524. 
33 Id. 
34 See Chi. Univ. Law Faculty, Comment, Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts—Pending Bills, 
31 MICH. L. REV. 59, 65–67 (1932) (discussing and assessing various bills in the Senate and House 
regarding changes to diversity jurisdiction law in response to Black & White Taxicab). 
35 Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415.  
36 For a detailed review of the hearings and reports of both the House and the Senate leading up to 
the passage of the amendment, see Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 
11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213–19 (1959). 
37 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 2–3 (1958); H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 2–3 (1958). 
38 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3. 
39 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3. 
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charter from another State.”40 The reports describe the unfairness that arises 
when two local corporations are not provided the same choice of courts, 
only because one of the corporations elected to obtain its charter from a 
different state.41 
Congress was also aware that a state charter’s grant of incorporation, 
and thereby fictive citizenship, did not necessarily mean the purpose behind 
the protections of diversity jurisdiction would be served when applied to 
corporations. Concluding its remarks on the problem of the existing judge-
made corporate citizenship law, the reports state, “It appears neither fair 
nor proper for such a corporation to avoid trial in the State where it has its 
principal place of business by resorting to a legal device not available to the 
individual citizen.”42 
The reports also reveal that bankruptcy law played a role in Congress’s 
choice of “principal place of business” as the factor for determining a 
corporation’s possible second state of citizenship, stating that the “principal 
place of business” analysis would parallel with jurisdictional tests 
employed by courts under the then-existing Bankruptcy Act.43 In relevant 
part, the Bankruptcy Act granted jurisdiction over “persons bankrupt who 
have had their principal place of business, resided or had their domicile 
within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six 
months.”44 
One early scholarly review of the 1958 amendment noted, “Ample 
[bankruptcy] precedent there was, but consistent precedent there was not.”45 
Indeed, the precedent established under Bankruptcy Act cases did not 
provide federal courts with sufficient guidance on the principal place of 
business test for active corporations.46 As for inactive or dissolved 
corporations, however, a couple of pre-1958 Second Circuit bankruptcy 
decisions stand for two noteworthy principles. 
First, debtors no longer engaging in business but instead only 
“winding up” their business activity still have a principal place of 
business.47 Second, debtor inactivity should not be an obstacle to 
 
40 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4. Both reports cite the Black & White 
Taxicab case immediately following the description of this evil. 
41 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4. 
42 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4. 
43 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4. 
44 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) (1952). 
45 James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship 
Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1426, 1439 (1964). 
46 As will be discussed later in this Note, the Supreme Court did not issue a definitive statement on 
the test until 2010. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
47 See In re Evans, 85 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1936) (Western District of New York court had principal 
place of business bankruptcy jurisdiction over an individual debtor who had no active business concerns 
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bankruptcy jurisdiction where it effectively removes one of the two forums 
Congress intended to create for bankruptcy proceedings.48 Neither principle 
clearly resolves the issue of whether an inactive or dissolved corporation 
can have a principal place of business; however, the Second Circuit 
principles arguably serve as the closest indicator of how Congress intended 
for the dissolved and inactive corporation issue to be resolved. Pre-1958 
bankruptcy courts used a functional interpretation of “principal place of 
business” that gave effect to the intent of Congress. 
Following the 1958 amendments, various federal district courts began 
to pass on the issue of what impact inactivity should have on the 
corporation’s citizenship.49 Almost forty years after the 1958 amendment, 
circuit courts of appeals began to take up the issue. 
C. A Circuit Split Emerges 
A three-way circuit split emerged in the 1990s over how trial courts 
should assess the citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations. To 
better understand the 2012 Holston court’s reasoning, it is worth taking a 
closer look at the defining cases that led to the current three-way split. 
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to make a statement on 
the citizenship of inactive or dissolved corporations for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes.50 In Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick 
Developers South, Inc., a construction company and its insurers sought to 
pierce the corporate veil of a closely held Florida real estate developer and 
recover a judgment rendered fifteen years earlier.51 The construction 
company was an inactive corporation that had incorporated in Ohio, but 
whose principal place of business when it had been active was Florida.52 
The district court ruled that it was obligated to consider both the 
 
but had conducted business in the Western District three years earlier and still maintained 
correspondence with his attorney who interacted with the debtor’s creditors in the Western District). 
48 Fada of N.Y., Inc. v. Org. Serv. Co., 125 F.2d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1942) (per curiam) (New York 
corporation that had been inactive over the months leading up to the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding 
remained a citizen of New York). 
49 Compare Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (arguing that even where 
it failed to formally dissolve itself, a corporation is inactive and has no principal place of business once 
it has sold all its assets, has no payroll, and is only “winding up its business affairs”), and Kreger v. 
Ryan Bros., 308 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (arguing that a corporation’s principal place of 
business cannot be a state where “only a flicker of corporate activity remains”), with Comtec, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 523–25 (D. Ariz. 1989) (arguing that the clear intent of 
Congress, bankruptcy precedent, and use of conjunctive in § 1332(c) all support finding that a 
corporation’s last principal place of business is determinative of a corporation’s citizenship).  
50 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991). 
51 Id. at 133–34. 
52 Id. at 134. 
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corporation’s state of incorporation and its last principal place of business.53 
Moreover, the district court concluded that an inactive corporation’s 
principal place of business was the state in which the corporation 
conducted its last business activity—in this case, Florida.54 
The Second Circuit affirmed.55 Reviewing the policy and legislative 
history behind the 1958 amendment in detail, the Passalacqua court 
reasoned that allowing the citizenship of an inactive corporation to be 
determined solely by its state of incorporation “would give [the 
corporation] a benefit Congress never planned for them.”56 The court 
supported its reasoning in part by reference to the Second Circuit 
bankruptcy principle that a corporation’s inactivity does not alter its 
citizenship.57 Although the Second Circuit did not address the “business 
activity” test that the district court used to determine the inactive 
corporation’s last principal place of business, it adopted the test a few years 
later.58 This test would be used for determining the principal place of 
business of both active and inactive or dissolved corporations and would 
prove to be significant in the development of the circuit split. 
Soon after, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the issue in a case, Harris v. 
Black Clawson Co., which involved the allegedly wrongful death or severe 
injury of three Louisiana workers.59 The case was originally brought in 
Louisiana state court, then was removed to federal court.60 After the federal 
court granted the plaintiffs leave to add new defendants, the plaintiffs 
moved to remand the case back to state court. The plaintiffs argued that one 
of the new defendants had had its principal place of business in Louisiana 
at the time of the dispute, despite having been inactive for over five years 
and incorporated in New York.61 
The Fifth Circuit adopted the reasoning of two Pennsylvania federal 
district court cases and ruled that the construction company did not have its 
principal place of business in Louisiana; therefore, diversity existed.62 The 
court used what is commonly referred to as the “total activity” test.63 Under 
 
53 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
54 Id. 




58 Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat’l Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 907 (2d Cir. 1996). 
59 961 F.2d 547, 548–49 (5th Cir. 1992). 
60 Id. at 549. 
61 Id. at 549–50. 
62 Id. at 550–51 (citing Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1973) and Kreger v. Ryan 
Bros., 308 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Pa. 1970)). 
63 Id. at 549. 
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this approach, a court balances the results of two tests: (1) the “nerve 
center” test that assesses the location of the corporation’s headquarters and 
primary decisionmakers; and (2) what is basically the Second Circuit’s 
“business activities” test, which assesses the primary location of the 
corporation’s business activities.64 
The Harris court surveyed, but did not explicitly rebut, Passalacqua’s 
discussion of the policy behind the 1958 amendment and how Congress 
intended courts to look to bankruptcy law when addressing “principal place 
of business” issues.65 Instead, the court reasoned that the Second Circuit’s 
use of the business activities test did not comport with the Fifth Circuit’s 
total activity test.66 By focusing solely on the inactive corporation’s last 
business activity and not on other facts about the makeup of the 
corporation, the Second Circuit’s approach could lead a court to find that 
an inactive corporation had a principal place of business that, under the 
Fifth Circuit’s total activity test, it would not have had while the 
corporation was active.67 The Harris court therefore ruled that its total 
activity test requires a court to consider an inactive corporation’s last 
business activity, but not necessarily conclude that such activity is 
dispositive in establishing the corporation’s principal place of business.68 
The Harris court’s rejection of the Second Circuit’s approach 
therefore had more to do with an underlying clash between tests used to 
determine a principal place of business than it did with a reasoned rejection 
of Passalacqua’s review of the policy and legislative history of the 1958 
amendment. The Fifth Circuit may not have rejected the Second Circuit’s 
rule had it known that the Supreme Court would eventually reject the total 
activity test. 
Three years later, the Third Circuit entered the fray in Midlantic 
National Bank v. Hansen.69 The case dealt with a Pennsylvania couple that 
defaulted on loans from a New Jersey lender used to purchase and start a 
Delaware savings corporation.70 When the couple defaulted on their loans, 
the then-existing federal Resolution Trust Corporation seized all of the 
wholly owned savings corporation’s assets.71 According to the defendant 
couple, the savings corporation became completely inactive following the 
seizure, except for being a party to ongoing litigation.72 Six months after 
 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 550–51. 
66 Id. at 551. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 48 F.3d 693 (3d Cir. 1995). 
70 Id. at 694–95. 
71 Id. at 695. 
72 Id. 
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the seizure, the New Jersey lender sued both the couple and the allegedly 
inactive savings corporation in federal court.73 
The defendants sought to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that although the savings corporation had been 
inactive for six months leading up to the lawsuit, its principal place of 
business had been in New Jersey.74 The district court denied the motion, 
and, on appeal, a Third Circuit panel affirmed.75 The Third Circuit, which 
used a “corporate activities” test to determine an active corporation’s 
principal place of business, reasoned that an inactive corporation has no 
activity and therefore no principal place of business.76 The Midlantic court 
surveyed circuit court case law and noted that its holding conflicted with 
Passalacqua and Harris, as well as a number of district court decisions 
from the Ninth Circuit.77 
In adopting a test that categorically excludes the possibility that a 
dissolved or inactive corporation could have a principal place of business, 
the Midlantic court conceded that its holding could “result in the 
subversion of the intent of Congress” in some cases.78 The court reasoned 
that this possibility was outweighed by the plain meaning of § 1332(c)(1), 
and emphasized that the provision’s use of the present tense “has” in “has 
its principal place of business.”79 If Congress had wanted § 1332 to cover 
inactive corporations, the court argued, it could have simply included “‘has 
or has had’ its principal place of business.”80 Ultimately, the Midlantic 
court reasoned that “the benefits of certainty and clarity [obtained] from the 
‘bright line’ approach we adopt outweigh the potential for the harm 
identified by the Second Circuit.”81 By the Midlantic court’s calculus, an 
inactive or dissolved corporation getting undeserved access to federal 
courts was less harmful than federal courts struggling to assess the 
corporation’s principal place of business. 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 695–96. 
75 Id. at 695. 
76 Id. at 696. 
77 Id. at 696–98. The Ninth Circuit district court decisions have noted that the use of the 
conjunctive in § 1332(c)(1)—state of incorporation and principal place of business—indicates that 
Congress wanted both citizenships to always be factored in. See China Basin Props., Ltd. v. Allendale 
Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1304–05 (N.D. Cal. 1992).  
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D. Assessing the Split 
To summarize, the divergent approaches to inactive or dissolved 
corporations can roughly be characterized as follows: 
TABLE 1: 
 
Test Used to Determine a 
Corporation’s Principal Place 
of Business at the Time the 
Decision Was Rendered 
Rule For Inactive/Dissolved 
Corporate Citizenship 
Second Circuit Business Activities 
Both state of incorporation and 
last principal place of business 
Fifth Circuit 
Total Activity (weigh both 
business activities and corporate 
headquarters “nerve center”) 
Always state of incorporation 
and court should conduct case-
by-case analysis of 
corporation’s total activities to 
determine if it is appropriate for 
corporation to have principal 
place of business citizenship 
Third Circuit Corporate Activities 
Categorically excludes 
consideration of principal place 
of business citizenship; a 
dissolved or inactive 
corporation is the only state of 
incorporation 
 
These varying interpretations of § 1332(c)(1) stemmed more from the 
varying types of pre-Hertz principal place of business tests than from a 
dispute over the contextual construction of § 1332(c)(1) and its legislative 
history. The business activities, total activity, and corporate activities tests 
used to determine the principal place of business of active corporations 
allowed for different outcomes when dealing with a dissolved or inactive 
corporation. 
Soon after the Midlantic decision, the scant scholarly attention to the 
issue of inactive and dissolved corporation citizenship emerged. One 
notable review found all three circuit approaches to be unsatisfactory: each 
was either over- or underinclusive so as to clash with Congress’s intent 
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behind § 1332(c)(1).82 The Second Circuit’s business activities test, which 
uses a corporation’s place of “last activity” for determining its principal 
place of business, improperly allows a failing corporation to take its 
winding-up activities to its state of incorporation, meaning that certain 
circumstances would allow the corporation to insulate itself from state 
court actions, even where the state court action could be entirely local in 
nature.83 The Third Circuit’s approach flatly conflicts with Congress’s 
intent by allowing for inactive or dissolved corporations to get undeserved 
access to federal courts, and the Fifth Circuit’s approach provides too 
vague a standard for courts to practically apply.84 
Timothy Yuncker argues that suits involving inactive corporations will 
become more commonplace, citing U.S. Department of Commerce 
statistics indicating that more and more corporations fail each year.85 For 
this reason, Yuncker argues that Congress should intervene and clarify 
§ 1332(c) by adding a provision specifically covering inactive 
corporations.86 Yuncker’s proposed statute would make an inactive 
corporation a citizen of its last principal place of business, so long as the 
cause of action before the court relates to conduct of the inactive 
corporation that occurred within 180 days of the corporation becoming 
inactive.87 If Congress were not to act, Yuncker advocates a modified 
version of the Fifth Circuit’s approach, which would require a court to 
factor in an inactive corporation’s last principal place of business unless the 
law of the state under which the plaintiff seeks relief provides that a 
defunct corporation can no longer be sued.88 
Following the development of the circuit split in the mid-1990s, only 
one other circuit court of appeals assessed the split before 2012, while 
district courts continued to struggle over how best to address the issue.89 
The Fourth Circuit in Athena Automotive, Inc. v. DiGregorio joined the 
Fifth Circuit in 1999.90 The court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit’s total 
 
82 Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c): The Search for a Principal Place of Business, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 829–34 (1997). 
83 Id. at 829–30. 
84 Id. at 831–34. 
85 Id. at 816–17.  
86 Id. at 834. 
87 Id. at 834–35. 
88 Id. at 836–38. 
89 See, e.g., Parker v. Moore, No. C 08-1896 PJH, 2008 WL 2220613 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2008) 
(district court in Ninth Circuit applying Fifth Circuit’s approach); see also Ball v. Dynamic Details Inc., 
Ariz., No. CV-06-1661-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 778410 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2007) (district court in Ninth 
Circuit applying the Second Circuit’s approach); Hogwood v. Hearthstone Mgmt. Grp., No. Civ.A. 99-
5208, 2001 WL 34387931 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2001) (district court in Third Circuit applying the Second 
Circuit’s approach).  
90 166 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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activity test would best distinguish those inactive corporations that no 
longer had any impact on their former locale and those whose winding-
down activity was still significant at the time the suit was filed.91 The 
Fourth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit’s categorical conclusion that an 
inactive corporation must be a citizen of its last place of business.92 The 
Fourth Circuit also rejected the Third Circuit’s approach because it would 
lead to results “demonstrably at odds with the statute.”93 
In assessing the split, Yuncker and the Fourth Circuit clearly sought a 
rule soundly based in the text and legislative history of § 1332(c)(1). 
Unfortunately, they did so at a time when much of the doctrine about how 
to determine the principal place of business for both active and inactive 
corporations was broadly open to question. Only the Supreme Court’s 
recent clarification of the doctrine made it possible to push the issue of 
dissolved and inactive corporation citizenship towards resolution. 
II. HERTZ AND HOLSTON 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz settled how courts should 
determine an active corporation’s principal place of business. The Court’s 
reasoning also provides more general guidance on how courts should 
handle issues involving diversity jurisdiction. Reviewing the Hertz decision 
in detail therefore lays the groundwork for assessing the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Holston, which adopted the Third Circuit’s approach and 
rejected the Second and Fifth Circuits’ approaches largely by reference to 
Hertz. 
A. Hertz’s Nerve Center Test & Bright-Line Reasoning 
A corollary and much more robust circuit split over how to determine 
an active corporation’s principal place of business arose soon after the 1958 
enactment of § 1332(c)(1). Struggling to give meaning to the phrase 
“principal place of business,” some circuits determined a corporation’s 
principal place of business by focusing solely on the location of the 
corporation’s headquarters or nerve center,94 some focused on the 
 
91 Id. at 291. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See, e.g., Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that the Seventh Circuit uses the nerve center test and searches for the corporation’s headquarters to 
determine the principal place of business).  
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corporation’s principal place of business activity,95 and others balanced the 
two considerations96 to come to a case-by-case determination. 
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, former employees of the Hertz Corporation 
brought a class action in California state court alleging violations of wage 
and hours laws.97 Hertz removed to federal court, asserting that it was 
neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business in California.98 
By raw numbers, California represented the plurality of Hertz’s business 
operations, sales figures, and payroll.99 Hertz argued, however, that its 
corporate leadership and administration were centered in New Jersey and 
that this should be the determinative factor for the location of its principal 
place of business.100 
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that it 
lacked diversity jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court entered the 
fray.101 The Court began by noting the purpose of diversity jurisdiction—
reducing prejudice against out-of-state parties.102 It observed that many of 
the factors that might indicate a concern over prejudice against 
corporations, such as the corporation’s image, history, and advertising 
practices, cannot easily be quantified.103 The Court openly questioned 
whether any possible principal place of business test could consistently 
protect a corporation against the biases it might or might not face in a state 
court.104 The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the nerve center 
approach of looking to where the corporation had its corporate 
headquarters was the most preferable test, meaning Hertz’s principal place 
of business was New Jersey.105 It rejected the business activities and 
balancing tests because they were too unwieldy and contained so many 
factors that even circuits purporting to follow the same test produced 
different results.106 
 
95 See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam) (stating that the Ninth Circuit only uses the nerve center test when the place of operations test 
does not reveal the state in which a corporation’s business activity predominates). 
96 See, e.g., Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that the 
Fifth Circuit focuses on both the nerve center and the place of activities in determining a corporation’s 
principal place of business); see also Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 915 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
97 559 U.S. 77, 81 (2010).  
98 Id. at 81–82. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 82. 
102 Id. at 92.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 92–97. 
106 Id. at 90–92. 
109:243 (2015) Digging Up the Corp(ses) 
259 
The Court laid out three considerations that, “taken together,” led to 
the uniform adoption of the nerve center test.107 First, the Court looked to 
the text of § 1332(c)(1). The Court focused on the statute’s phrase: “State 
where it has its principal place of business.”108 The Court viewed the use of 
“place” in the singular rather than “places” as an indication that Congress 
wanted courts to pick the most prominent place within a state that the 
corporation did its business.109 Whereas business activity usually occurs in 
many different places––and possibly in more than one state––the Court 
reasoned that a corporation’s nerve center, such as a headquarters, is 
typically perceived by the public as being one, particular place that is the 
corporation’s “main place of business.”110 
Second, the Court stated that “administrative simplicity is a major 
virtue in a jurisdictional statute.”111 Adopting a complicated jurisdictional 
test would waste time on nonmerit issues, encourage gamesmanship, and 
lead to more appeals and reversals.112 A simple rule, in contrast, would 
promote predictability in aid of a corporation’s business decisions and 
increase the likelihood that a verdict or settlement will be based on the 
substantive merits of the case.113 
Third, the Court looked to legislative history. It noted that early 
iterations of what eventually would become the 1958 amendments 
contained a numerical test that would make a corporation a citizen of the 
state in which it took in over half of its gross income.114 Because Congress 
rejected this test as too difficult to apply, and because a business activity 
test involved the same difficult application, the Court reasoned the nerve 
center test best accorded with Congress’s intent.115 
The Court acknowledged that the nerve center test could lead to results 
that would conflict with the purpose of § 1332, such as a corporation whose 
public face and activities are centered in New Jersey but whose corporate 
headquarters are just across the border in New York.116 These situations, the 
Court reasoned, were effectively collateral damage to a clear rule that 
supports simpler jurisdictional administration and a more uniform legal 
system.117 One scholar has interpreted Hertz as the latest signal of a recently 
 
107 Id. at 93. 
108 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012)). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 94. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 95.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 96. 
117 See id.  
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developed principle of statutory construction: the “anti-messiness” 
principle.118 The anti-messiness principle favors tests that do not require 
complicated factual inquiries.119 The merits of the principle and the 
arguments of those who argue for the principle’s broad application to 
federal jurisdiction is a matter of ongoing debate.120 
B. Holston Harnesses Hertz 
In the wake of Hertz’s adoption of the nerve center test, the Eleventh 
Circuit Holston court leaned heavily on what it deemed to be Hertz’s broad 
directive on how to analyze diversity jurisdiction issues. The Holston court 
faced a Florida corporation suing a Delaware-chartered corporation that 
clearly, under Hertz’s nerve center test, had once had its principal place of 
business in Florida.121 Nonetheless, the Holston court found that 
LanLogistics’s formal dissolution just months before broke off the district 
court’s ability to factor LanLogistics’s principal place of business in a 
diversity jurisdiction analysis.122 
To determine the citizenship of the dissolved corporation before it, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Holston clearly structured its analysis of the law by 
assessing how the circuit split tests accorded with Hertz.123 The Holston 
court, however, did not clearly go through all three of the Hertz 
considerations. Instead, the court focused its attention on the benefit of 
clear-cut rules, even those that conflict with the rationale behind § 1332.124 
Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Harris, the Holston court quickly 
disposed of the Second Circuit’s approach to the issue, focusing on the fact 
that Hertz rejected the Second Circuit’s use of the business activity test for 
determining the citizenship of active corporations.125 The court reasoned 
that because the Second Circuit used a business activity test, “a corporation 
 
118 Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012). 
119 Id. at 1505–07; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and 
Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 511–13 (2012) (comparing preference 
for rules for determining diversity jurisdiction to other areas of jurisdictional law that employ 
standards).  
120 Compare Nash, supra note 119, at 512–13 (arguing for a rule-based approach to jurisdictional 
inquiries checked by a standard-based abstention doctrine), with Scott Dodson & Elizabeth McCuskey, 
Response, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 31 (2012) 
(arguing that a rule-based approach to jurisdictional inquiries contains underlying ambiguities that call 
into question the purported benefits of the approach).  
121 See Holston III, 677 F.3d 1068, 1069 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
122 Id. at 1071. 
123 Id. at 1070–71. 
124 Id. at 1071. 
125 Id. 
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could be considered a citizen of a state in which it was not a citizen before 
dissolution.”126 
The Holston court did not address, however, how Hertz could be read 
to refute the broader rationale of the Second Circuit—to always factor an 
inactive and dissolved corporation’s last principal place of business, 
regardless of the specific test used to determine a corporation’s principal 
place of business. Nothing in Holston addresses whether the Second 
Circuit’s approach might be the most preferable if it used the nerve center 
test instead of a business activity test to assess an inactive or dissolved 
corporation’s last principal place of business. 
Implicitly rejecting the Fifth and Fourth Circuits’ total activity 
approach, the Holston court adopted the Third Circuit’s bright-line 
approach of never considering a dissolved corporation’s principal place of 
business.127 The court acknowledged that the Third Circuit’s test could lead 
to results that were inconsistent with the purpose of § 1332.128 This was 
acceptable, however, because of Hertz’s allowance of collateral damage in 
the process of adopting a bright-line approach129: “This bright-line rule may 
open federal courts to an occasional corporation with a lingering local 
presence, but undeserved access to a fair forum is a small price to pay for 
the clarity and predictability that a bright-line rule provides.”130 The 
Holston court therefore ruled that a dissolved corporation has no principal 
place of business.131 
III. A MODIFIED SECOND CIRCUIT NERVE CENTER TEST 
Before going into detail on why the Holston bright-line approach is 
troublesome and a modified Second Circuit approach is preferable, I begin 
with a recitation of facts borrowed from a suit decided in the early 2000s 
that helps to show the real-world implications of the two approaches. 
In 2001, a resident of California filed a complaint in California state 
court against his former employer, Bay Area Foods, and its holding 
company, Bay Area Holding.132 Up until roughly two years before the suit 
was filed, the defendant corporations had operated twelve stores and 








132 Sellers v. Kohlberg & Co., No. C 01-01365 WHA, 2001 WL 761187, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 
2001). 
133 Id. 
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lack of diversity between the plaintiff and his former employer, the 
defendants removed the case to federal court on the theory that Bay Area 
Foods had been incorporated in Delaware and had ceased business 
operations two years before the lawsuit.134 It would be difficult to describe 
Bay Area Foods as anything other than the type of business Congress 
hoped to exclude from federal courts in 1958: “a local institution, engaged 
in a local business and in many cases locally owned.”135 Based on the 
legislative history of § 1332(c)(1), it would seem Bay Area Foods should 
not be “enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply because 
it has obtained a corporate charter from another State.”136 Employing the 
bright-line test adopted by the Holston court, however, Bay Area Foods 
would get access to the federal courts because any undeserved access is 
merely collateral damage to the benefits of the bright-line approach. 
A more thorough look at the history of diversity jurisdiction and Hertz 
reveals that this is a problematic outcome. Congress affirmatively acted to 
restrict the ability of corporations to access federal courts in 1958.137 
Congress was motivated both by administrative concerns and by the 
unfairness of one local corporation getting federal court access that another 
local corporation would not get merely because it chose to incorporate in 
the state in which it conducts its business.138 Hertz perhaps stands for courts 
adopting “non-messy” rules, but it does not instruct courts to ignore the 
intent of Congress. 
A modified Second Circuit approach would satisfy Hertz and more 
closely align to the goal of § 1332(c)(1). Under this approach, a court 
would establish an inactive or dissolved corporation’s principal place of 
business by determining where it had its last nerve center (basically, its last 
corporate headquarters). Unlike the business activity test employed by the 
Second Circuit pre-Hertz, finding an inactive or dissolved corporation’s 
last corporate headquarters would not be particularly fact-intensive or 
administratively burdensome. For example, nothing in Holston or Sellers 
indicates that either trial court would have struggled to determine the 
inactive or dissolved corporation’s last corporate headquarters.139 Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine different circumstances where it would be hard. 
The Holston court claimed to be resolving the question of dissolved 
and inactive corporate citizenship by applying the analytical framework 
 
134 Id. 
135 See id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958)); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-
1706, at 4 (1958).  
136 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4.  
137 See Friedenthal, supra note 36, at 213. 
138 Id. at 214. 
139 See Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also Sellers, 2001 WL 761187, 
at *4. 
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used in Hertz to determine the appropriate principal place of business test. 
As discussed previously, there is reason to question the fidelity of that 
application.140 The Holston court did not clearly conduct the three-prong 
Hertz analysis of statutory language, administrative simplicity, and 
legislative history.141 Instead, the Holston court focused almost exclusively 
on the administrative-simplicity prong.142 A thorough analysis of Hertz’s 
three considerations reveals that, with minimal changes, the Second Circuit 
has it right. 
A. Hertz Prong One: Text of § 1332(c)(1) 
The first prong involves an analysis of the statutory language of 
§ 1332(c)(1). The Third Circuit in Midlantic arguably gave the most 
thoughtful attempt at the plain meaning of § 1332(c)(1) and concluded that 
the present tense use of “has” in “has its principal place of business” means 
a corporation has to be in existence in order to have a principal place of 
business.143 The Midlantic court rejected the argument that the conjunctive 
use of “and” in § 1332(c)(1) was relevant in determining the citizenship of 
an inactive corporation.144 While there could be endless arguments over the 
meaning of “and,” a closer look at the Midlantic court’s “has” argument 
indicates that its statutory language argument is lacking. Even a brief 
review of Delaware corporation law shows that just because a Delaware-
chartered corporation has dissolved does not mean that it is by any means 
“dead” and therefore incapable of having things in the present.145 A 
dissolved corporation often has assets and liabilities for some time after 
dissolution. Although it is perhaps more intuitive to think a dissolved or 
inactive corporation cannot have a principal place of business, legally there 
is no reason this is the case. This calls into question how the Midlantic and 
Holston courts could so easily assume that a corporation, by dissolving or 
becoming inactive, has totally ceased to exist and thereby lost its ability to 
possess things in the present tense, including statutorily conferred 
citizenship. 
 
140 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
141 See Holston III, 677 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93–95 (2010). 
142 Holston III, 677 F.3d at 1070–71. 
143 48 F.3d 693, 697–98 (3d Cir. 1995). 
144 Id. at 698. 
145 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011) (“All corporations, whether they expire by their own 
limitation or are otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be continued, for the term of 3 years from such 
expiration or dissolution or for such longer period as the Court of Chancery shall in its discretion direct, 
bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits, whether civil, criminal or 
administrative, by or against them . . . .”). 
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The battle over dissolved and inactive corporations’ citizenship, 
however, cannot and need not be won or lost by statutory construction 
alone. This consideration proves to be inconclusive at best, meaning it is 
appropriate to move on to the other two prongs of the Hertz analysis. 
B. Hertz Prong Two: Administrative Simplicity 
The Hertz second-prong consideration of administrative simplicity 
dooms the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ total activity approach. Hertz’s 
rejection of the total activity and other fact-intensive tests clearly indicates 
the Court would not adopt a rule that allows for case-by-case 
considerations of a corporation’s activities.146 
Both the Second Circuit and Holston applied bright-line tests. The 
Holston court, however, reasoned that the Third Circuit’s bright-line test 
was easier to apply since it did not assess the last activity of the inactive or 
dissolved corporation in question.147 The most apparent flaw in this 
reasoning is that, with only a minor adjustment to accord with Hertz’s 
nerve center test, the Second Circuit’s Passalacqua rule would not be 
significantly burdensome to apply. Under a modified Second Circuit rule, a 
court would still always factor in a dissolved or inactive corporation’s most 
recent principal place of business. The only difference would be that rather 
than determining the corporation’s most recent principal place of business 
by assessing the corporation’s business activity, the court would do so by 
looking for the corporation’s last corporate headquarters. 
There is no reason to think that determining a dissolved or inactive 
corporation’s most recent corporate headquarters would be any more 
burdensome than doing so for an active corporation. While this issue has 
not widely been explored, one can more easily imagine a court struggling 
to assess whether a corporation is actually inactive or dissolved than a court 
struggling to assess a corporation’s most recent corporate headquarters. A 
modified Second Circuit rule would accord with Hertz’s preference for 
administrative simplicity and would give litigants all of the predictability 
they could need: regardless of whether it is dissolved or inactive, a 
corporation would be a citizen of the state where it most recently had its 
corporate headquarters, as well as of the state where it incorporated.148 With 
two out of the three Hertz considerations addressed, it remains unclear how 
 
146 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 90–93. 
147 See Holston III, 677 F.3d at 1071. 
148 Any concern about how long an inactive or dissolved corporation should be subject to suit is 
irrelevant here. Section 1332(c)(1) citizenship does not create any cause of action, but instead only 
allows federal courts to hear state law cases. States are free to pass statutes of limitation that would bar 
suits, both in state and federal court, after the passage of a certain period of time.  
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the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule is materially more favorable under Hertz 
than would be a modified Second Circuit approach. 
C. Hertz Prong Three: Legislative History 
The third Hertz consideration, legislative history, tips the scales in 
favor of the modified Second Circuit approach. Three aspects of the 
legislative history are relevant here: (1) the legislative history indicating 
Congress’s primary concern behind enacting § 1332(c)(1) was to alleviate 
federal court dockets; (2) the legislative history indicating Congress was 
concerned about the evils of undeserved access to federal courts; and 
(3) the bankruptcy-like scheme Congress envisioned would guide the 
implementation of § 1332(c)(1). 
As to the first aspect, neither rule is likely to practically address 
Congress’s concern, at least by current trends in diversity suits coming 
before federal courts. Contrary to Timothy Yuncker’s prediction,149 no 
significant docket-load spike has occurred on account of inactive or 
dissolved corporations. An admittedly inexact search of cases involving 
disputes over an inactive or dissolved corporation’s citizenship suggests 
that fewer than 100 such cases have come before the federal courts between 
1990 and October 2013.150 Even if these sorts of cases are not common, 
however, the fact remains that the adoption of the Holston rule across the 
federal courts would result in at least some increase in federal cases: the 
rule logically allows for more situations where a corporation can access 
federal courts. 
The second legislative history consideration decisively disfavors the 
Holston court approach. Congress clearly expressed its desire to prevent the 
“evil” of local corporations receiving diversity jurisdiction access to the 
federal courts merely because they had made the decision to incorporate in 
a different state.151 Particularly in situations like the Bay Area Foods case, 
where there was no question that all actors and issues confronting the court 
were decisively local in nature,152 the Holston rule would not accord with 
 
149 Yuncker, supra note 82, at 816–17. 
150 The search was conducted on WestlawNext. WESTLAWNEXT, http://next.westlaw.com 
[https://perma.cc/KET6-F43M] (search “inactiv! OR dissol! /s corp! /s divers!”). A review of the 
roughly 150 results indicates that far fewer than 100 of the results actually dealt with citizenship 
definition disputes. While by no means a thorough empirical analysis, this author is convinced that 
Yuncker’s prediction of burdensome caseloads has, at least until now, not occurred. 
151 S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958) (noting that court-crafted doctrine on the citizenship of 
corporations “has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local business and in 
many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has 
obtained a corporate charter from another State”); H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4 (1958) (same). 
152 Sellers v. Kohlberg & Co., No. C 01-01365 WHA, 2001 WL 761187, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 
29, 2001). 
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the clearly expressed desire of Congress to keep local disputes out of the 
federal courts. 
It is true that the nerve center test adopted in Hertz permits this same 
evil. The difference between Hertz and Holston, however, is that Hertz 
settled a dispute over many plausible principal place of business tests. 
None of the tests considered by the Hertz court categorically excluded the 
possibility of a corporation not having a principal place of business. 
Instead, the varying tests would occasionally lead to a corporation 
obtaining diversity jurisdiction under one test, but not the other, depending 
on the facts of the case. In contrast, the difference between a modified 
Second Circuit approach and the Holston approach is that one dictates that 
an inactive or dissolved corporation is always only a citizen of its state of 
incorporation, while the other at least allows the possibility of two states of 
citizenships. Particularly because only Congress, not the federal courts, has 
the authority to expand or contract diversity jurisdiction, federal courts 
should disfavor an approach that would categorically permit an expansion 
of diversity jurisdiction. 
Rather than see how its rule would, on an institutional basis, make it 
more likely for inactive or dissolved corporations to receive underserved 
access to federal courts, it appears the Holston court might have been 
distracted by the other “evil” it faced. Because the lower court in Holston 
did not fully address subject matter jurisdiction concerns until after trial,153 
using a different rule would have meant that two years of federal court 
adjudication would have occurred for nothing: the judgment would have 
had to be vacated and the whole case would have had to go to state court 
for relitigation. Although nothing in the Holston opinions indicates the 
Eleventh Circuit was outcome-determinative in its reasoning, it is 
indisputable that a different outcome in the case would have been highly 
undesirable from a judicial resource and equity viewpoint. The opposite 
outcome would have meant that the Holston district court spent years 
adjudicating a case it did not have jurisdiction over.154 Furthermore, the 
district court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff would have been meaningless 
and the plaintiff’s claim would have had to be relitigated in state court. 
Instead of its diversity of citizenship ruling, the clear takeaway from 
Holston should be that no federal court should proceed with adjudication 
until it is satisfied that jurisdiction exists.155 A modified Second Circuit test, 
 
153 See Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
154 Holston I, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (first reported district court decision in the 
Holston case); see also Holston II, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (final district court decision before appeal in 
the Holston case). 
155 Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction 
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 
(2006). 
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applied at the start of litigation, would provide the same sort of bright-line 
rule used by the Holston court without allowing for the problematic results 
already discussed. 
Finally, a look to pre-1958 bankruptcy principles, which the 1958 
Congress expressly referenced when adopting § 1332(c)(1),156 provides 
additional support for a modified Second Circuit approach. The Second 
Circuit’s pre-1958 bankruptcy jurisdiction principles indicate that courts 
should interpret ambiguities in the meaning of “principal place of business” 
by looking to what forums Congress intended to make available.157 The 
1958 amendment’s use of the term is clearly meant to limit, not expand, 
forum options.158 Accordingly, a modified Second Circuit approach is the 
most appropriate. 
Taken as a whole, the three Hertz considerations strongly support a 
modified Second Circuit test. The test provides a bright-line rule that 
reasonably resolves the ambiguity in the text of § 1332(c)(1) with the clear 
intent of Congress as shown through the legislative history. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit in Holston faced two unsavory options. The 
court could have applied a thoroughly supported rule that would have 
determined a dissolved or inactive corporation’s principal place of business 
by a nerve center test. This first option would have required the court to 
allow LanLogistics to escape an adverse judgment and render two years of 
federal court litigation useless. The Holston court instead chose the second 
unsavory option, which allowed it to preserve the trial court’s judgment at 
the cost of applying a pre-existing, but insufficiently reasoned rule that 
categorically allows all dissolved and inactive corporations to have their 
citizenship determined only by their state of incorporation. 
Courts should not follow the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to go with the 
latter rule. Instead, a modified version of the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Passalacqua—that a court must always determine a dissolved or inactive 
corporation’s principal place of business by using a nerve center analysis—
best accords with the directives of the Supreme Court in Hertz and the 




156 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
157 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
158 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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